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12 INTEGRATING COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY WITH COGN ITlVE PSYCHOLOGY 
Sonja I. Yoerg 
Alan C. Kamil 
University of Massachusetts 
ABSTRACT 
Cognitive ethology has been defined by Griffin (1978,1981, 1984) as the study 
of mental experiences in animals, restricting the domain of the field to 
phenomena thought to reveal intentionality, awareness, and conscious think- 
ing. We argue that attempts to study these processes, while revealing 
impressive behavioral complexity, have proven unsuccessful in establishing 
the importance of mental experiences in determining animal behavior prima- 
rily because of the intractability of the problem. We suggest a difSerent 
approach that draws upon the rich theory and sophisticated methodology of 
human and animal cognitive psychology while retaining an ecological and 
evolutionary perspective. Brief accounts of the conceptual underpinnings of 
cognitive psychology are presented as well as examples of empirical work, 
including the analysis of imagery in human and nonhuman animals. We hope 
our broad redefinition of cognitive ethology provides a rigorous framework 
within which to examine the role of cognition in ecologically relevant 
behavior. 
The term cognitive ethology could have many meanings given the variety of 
meanings attached to the word cognitive and to the word ethology. Griffin 
(1978, 1981, 1984) defined cognitive ethology as the "study of the mental 
experiences of animals". In this paper, we will argue that this definition of 
cognitive ethology is impractical and unproductive, because nonobservable 
conscious mental events constitute the very heart of the field. In overem- 
phasizing conscious events and largely ignoring the efforts of cognitive 
scientists, this definition is unduly restrictive. There is a more suitable 
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definition possible for cognitive ethology, one that involves true integration 
of the cognitive and ethological approaches and offers hope of eventually 
understanding the structure, evolution, and function of mind. 
When defined in terms of mental events, cognitive ethology has two 
major flaws. First, it suffers from the absence of theories that make testable 
predictions. This problem stems partly from the nature of the subject 
matter that the field has defined as its domain as well as from a reluctance 
to convert vague and unparsimonious mentalistic accounts of cognitive 
phenomena into viable hypotheses amenable to empirical test. Second, 
because of the narrow scope of cognitive ethology, it remains virtually 
untouched by the theories, data, and methodological developments of 
human and animal cognitive psychology. This is not healthy. We contend 
that cognitive ethology can and should be more broadly defined. 
In the next section of this paper, we outline the defining characteristics of 
current cognitive ethology, give its interpretation of the domain of cognitive 
analyses, and identify some of the problems caused by this definition and 
interpretation. The field of cognitive psychology is then defined, empha- 
sizing the centrality of the information processing metaphor to both the 
initial development of the discipline and its current status as a powerful 
agent in the study of cognitive events. We describe how cognitive processing 
and organization are examined in nonhuman animals, provide examples, 
and outline the new trend toward ecologically motivated studies of animal 
cognition. We argue that cognitive ethology should be this ecological 
comparative approach to the study of animal cognition. 
COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY 
According to Griffin (1978, 1981, 1984), the subject matter of cognitive 
ethology is consciousness, awareness, emotion, intentionality, and con- 
scious thinking in animals; in short, mental experiences. For example, 
Griffin (1984) states that the challenge of cognitive ethology "is to venture 
across the species boundary and try to gather satisfactory information 
about what other species may think or feel" (p. 12). This is a restricted use 
of the word cognition, which is usually defined as the process or faculty of 
knowing. Cognitive psychology operates within this broader definition as 
the study of how knowledge is acquired, processed, and used. Throughout 
cognitive psychology, the category of cognitive processes includes not only 
those involved in mental experience but those involved in all mental events 
regardless of whether the animal itself experiences those events. (An 
elaboration of the goals of cognitive psychology is given in a subsequent 
section.) 
Certain characteristics of cognitive ethology are consequences of this 
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definition. First, there is an emphasis on continuity with human mental 
experiences (e.g., Griffin, 1978). This occurs because the best (and perhaps 
only) source of evidence of consciousness comes from ourselves. The 
second best source of evidence results from our willingness to generalize 
from our own experience to those of other humans. And if we are willing to 
make that generalization among humans, it can be argued that the 
generalization should be extended to include nonhuman animals as well. 
For example, most humans would agree that they have had mental images, 
picture-like experiences in the absence of a concurrent visual stimulus, and 
assume that this holds for humans in general. Why not, then, grant the 
likelihood of imagery in other animals? Arguments based on evolutionary 
continuity are used to support the parsimony of this generalization (e.g., 
Griffin, 1978). 
Second, defining cognitive ethology as the study of mental experiences 
promotes an emphasis on communicative behavior. The reasoning is that 
because human thought is largely language mediated, then ". . . insofar as 
animal communication shares basic properties of human language, the 
employment of versatile communication systems by animals becomes 
evidence that they have mental experiences and communicate with con- 
scious intent" (Griffin, 1978, p. 528). First, formal and functional similar- 
ities between human and nonhuman communication do not demand the 
operation of conscious processes in both instances. Second, because it is 
assumed that mental experiences are particularly visible through the 
window of communication, the relation between communicative behavior 
and thought, intent, and awareness may be exaggerated. Do words neces- 
sarily speak louder than actions? 
Collecting Evidence 
If we accept for the moment that cognitive ethology is the study of mental 
experiences, we can then ask how this enterprise is and ought to be 
conducted. Griffin (1984) has suggested some criteria for inferring con- 
scious thought: (a) "plastic" behavior, (b) modifiable aspects to a complex 
behavior pattern, and (c) anticipation or intentional planning. The plausi- 
bility of these criteria are not at issue. Rather, we need some way to progress 
from criteria that are suggestive of conscious thought, imagery, or aware- 
ness to criteria that are indicative of them. General arguments based on 
continuity with human mental experiences (given that we have adequate 
methods for assessing them) can only imply the possibility of the existence 
of similar attributes in nonhuman species. They cannot establish the 
continuity. There are certainly enough examples of complex behavior in 
animals to allow inferences about almost any sort of mental experience to 
be drawn if the only criteria were the possibility of the existence of such 
experiences. But if cognitive ethology is to be a science, it must do more 
than point to interesting cases in which one interpretation of the observed 
behavior involves conscious thought or intent. 
Current cognitive ethology is virtually atheoretical. Without theory, there 
are no meaningful predictions. Without meaningful predictions (ideally 
from competing theories) data are difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate. 
If cognitive ethology is defined as the study of mental events in animals, its 
theories should consist of possible answers to the question: What should 
behavior look like if it is influenced by mental experiences? Of course the 
question asks about behavior and not about mental experiences themselves 
because we cannot observe mental events directly. It is critical both that the 
theories make specific predictions and that the postulated mental experi- 
ences be distinguishable in their effects from other mental experiences and 
from internal (and external) events in general. For example, a theory of the 
effect of visual imagery on orientation to,remote food sources would have 
to do more than predict the use of visual information in finding food. It 
would have to propose a working definition of what it means to use a visual 
image and then predict behavioral outcomes that follow from that defini- 
tion and do not follow from the use of visual information in a form other 
than an image. 
Consider Ristau's (this volume) work on injury feigning in plovers. When 
an intruder approaches the nest, parent plovers may exhibit a broken-wing 
display, fluttering along on the ground in a position that gives the 
appearance of an injured bird. Among other goals, Ristau is interested in 
determining the extent to which the plover is intentionally leading the 
intruder away from the nest. That is, does the plover know that feigning 
injury will lure the intruder away? Does the plover know that it is deceiving 
the intruder in doing so? The data collected demonstrate that the form of 
the display is sensitive to the behavior of the intruder; the bird adjusts the 
direction of the display or its intensity depending on the intruder's response. 
How do these data bear on the question of intentionality? Although the 
data do indicate that the function of the behavior is to direct intruders away 
from the nest, there is nothing that necessitates the invocation of conscious 
intent as an explanation. Ristau (this volume) has more recently shown that 
an intruder that threatened a nest earlier evoked a more intense display on 
subsequent intrusions. This result is also silent on the question of inten- 
tionality. It does suggest that the plover remembers individual intruders and 
can use that memory in determining the strength of subsequent displays - 
an interesting finding. 
In order to assess the role of intentionality in the plover's behavior, a 
theory must be formulated that specifies behavioral outcomes that would 
not occur if the plover did not intend to lure the intruder away from the 
nest. To justify the use of the concept of intentionality, a behavioral 
equivalence class must be defined, and a prediction about behavior must be 
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made that depends uniquely on the awareness of the plover of its own 
behavior. We cannot think of a theory that would make that prediction. 
That does not mean that we cannot bring ourselves to believe that plovers 
or any other animal may be capable of intention. It means that we cannot 
conceive of an experiment that would prove it. 
One aspect of cognitive ethology that tends to obscure the absence of 
theory is the tendency to confuse the thought and words that experimenters 
use to formulate research questions with the explanations assigned to the 
resulting data. It is a common if not ubiquitous practice for students of 
animal behavior to place themselves in the position of an animal confronted 
with a situation, problem, or task and ask, "What would I do?" Our own 
phenomenology is clearly a rich source of ideas about what animals might 
do or how they might do it. Indeed, Tolman, perhaps the first cognitive 
psychologist, said: "I, in my future work intend to go ahead imagining how, 
if I were a rat, I would behave" (1938, p. 24). There is nothing wrong with 
asking oneself: "If I were a plover and I were trying to get an intruder away 
from my nest, how would I behave?" It is, however, wrong to assume that 
the subjective experience that stimulated an experiment is isomorphic with 
the experience of the animals in that experiment. The interpretation of data 
should follow from a careful analysis of the consonance of those data with 
the predictions of a theory and not with one's own introspections. We may 
talk or think loosely under some conditions about what our animals might 
be doing or thinking, but we should be circumspect in our evaluation of the 
level or complexity of explanation the evidence demands. 
It is informative to consider an analogous problem in behavioral ecology. 
Optimal foraging models assume that foraging animals have been selected 
to maximize some quantity related to fitness, usually intake rate. These 
models, therefore, describe a method of. calculating rate of intake as a 
function of various environmental and behavioral parameters such as prey 
value and handling time. The calculations often entail high-level mathemat- 
ics, and some computer simulations require significant processing time on 
powerful machines. But one cannot contend, when the predictions of an 
optimal foraging model are confirmed, that the forager calculates optima 
the way the model does; evidence for how information is processed 
necessitates a different sort of theory. Cognitive ethologists must maintain 
the distinction between the tactics of the theoretician and those of the 
animal. 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO COGNITIVE 
ETHOLOGY 
We have been very critical of cognitive ethology as defined in terms of 
mental experience. One aspect of cognitive ethology, however, has had a 
positive impact. Animal behaviorists - ethologists, behavioral ecologists, 
and comparative psychologists - all face a substantial challenge illuminated 
by Griffin (1978, 1981) and others: the complexity of animal behavior. The 
development of cognitive ethology has helped emphasize that animals 
routinely engage in behavior more complex than most ethologists or 
psychologists would have thought plausible as is amply demonstrated in 
other chapters of this volume. The discovery of this complexity suggests 
that there ought to be a field called cognitive ethology, but it should not be 
loosely slung in a net of mentalistic verbiage. Rather, it should be defined 
as the rigorous, wholly scientific study of cognition in an ethological an$ 
ecological context. 
Many phenomena show that cognitive processes such as learning, atten- 
tion, categorization, recognition, and memory can play important roles in 
the lives of animals in the field (Kamil, 1988; Yoerg, in prep). As we have 
discussed extensively elsewhere (Kamil, 1988; Kamil & Yoerg, 1982; Yoerg, 
in prep), evidence for the importance of behavioral complexity has come 
from psychology, ethology, and behavioral ecology. How do we integrate 
these different approaches to the study of behavior? In the remainder of 
this paper, we develop the idea of a cognitive ethology that combines the 
best of cognitive science with the best of ethology. 
COGNITION 
The history of the study of cognition is not a simple one. Its initial 
development cannot be attributed to the work of one, two, or even a few 
people. Furthermore, the study of cognition was, and continues to be, 
influenced by many fields. (For historical accounts see Gardner, 1985; 
Knapp, 1986). Most scholars agree, however, that Neisser's (1967) book 
Cognitive psychology was a seminal work, the first to establish the use of 
the term that serves as its title. Neisser (1967) states that: 
Cognition refers to all the processes by which the sensory input is trans- 
formed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. It is concerned 
with these processes even when' they operate in the absence of relevant 
stimulation, as in images and hallucinations. Such terms as sensation, 
perception, imagery, retention, recall, problem-solving and thinking, among 
many others, refer to the hypothetical stages or aspects of cognition. (p. 4) 
More recent definitions are essentially similar to this. 
The development of cognitive psychology was tremendously influenced 
by, if not wholly dependent on, the advent of the communication and 
information sciences (Lachman, Lachman, & Butterfield, 1979). Abstrac- 
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tion about the nature of man-made physical systems was borrowed from 
communications engineering and information theory and applied to the 
study of human mental states and processes: Environmental stimuli became 
inputs of information, responses (behavior) became the system's output. 
Conceptualizations about what might intervene between input and output 
were formulated in the same language using terms such as channel capacity, 
serial and parallel processing, and coding to refer to how information 
travelled through and was transformed by the human mind. 
Palmer and Kimchi (1986) identify and discuss at length the fundamental 
assumptions of this information processing approach to the study of 
cognition. We will outline only the essential points here. First, mental 
events are functionally analogous to informational events, which consist of 
an input, an operation performed on that input, and a resulting output. The 
temporal order among components of informational events specifies the 
characteristics of information flow through the system. Information in this 
system is embodied in states called representations; the operations that are 
performed on that information are embodied in changes of state caIled 
processes. The task of the cognitive psychologist from an information 
processing perspective is to determine the nature and organization of the 
processes which transform, encode, represent, and use information from 
the external (or internal) world to produce behavior. 
The domain of cognitive psychology can be divided into two interrelated 
areas: (a) the nature of the representation of information (cognitive 
content) and (b) the nature of the processing (cognitive structure and 
function). One question about representation c6ncerns coding: What are 
the rules that relate the features of the stimulus input to the features of the 
representation of the information in that input? For example, in rernem- 
bering someone's face, what is the relation between the contents of memory 
and the real face? When we form a concept do we represent distinct 
features, an ideal standard, or an array of exemplars from our experience 
(Smith & Medin, 1986)? 
Issues of representation and coding are linked with those of processing 
and organization. Early views of cognitive processing (e.g., Broadbent, 
1958) accepted a linear view of information flow in which information was 
transformed in a series of discrete stages beginning with sensation and 
ending with long-term memory and/or output to effectors. Emphasis was 
given to the temporal dimensions of the system with little attention to 
content or the kinds of processing involved. More recent models attempt to 
accomodate the wealth of empirical data that suggest less linear, more 
complex flow dynamics. For example, cognitive psychologists now distin- 
guish between bottom-up (sensory-driven) and top-down (concept-driven) 
processes. In bottom-up processing, the form of the input determines the 
nature and extent of the processing-the animal is a relatively passive 
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receiver of information. In top-down processing, the evaluation of sensory 
input depends on previous experience, expectations, and the current 
context. Most cognitive activity seems to involve the simultaneous interac- 
tion of both topdown and bottom-up processing (e.g., Neisser, 1976). For 
example, perception is usually conceived of as a bottom-up process in that 
we appear to perceive directly what exists in the world. But expectations can 
affect perception drastically: Many apparent road kills are really paperbags 
or pieces of tire. Similarly, remembering would appear to be a top-down 
process because it requires and depends on past experience. However, the 
features of the cues used to guide recall are critical to its efficiency. Other 
questions about the functional organization of cognition include whether 
component operations of processes are carried out serially or in parallel 
(e.g., Sternberg, 1966), and whether processing is modular and content- 
specific (e.g., Fodor, 1983), or more global and content-independent 
(Anderson, 1983). 
The Role of Computer Science 
The information processing approach to the study of cognition is, of 
course, allied with computer science which represents the most advanced 
information science. However, the influence of concepts and methodology 
from computer science is not uniform throughout cognitive psychology. 
Two major positions can be identified: (a) adherence to "weak artificial 
intelligence (AI)" and (b) adherence to "strong AI" (Searle, 1980). Believers 
in weak A1 consider the computer only a powerful ally in attempts to 
understand cognitive processing, especially when modelling cognitive func- 
tions. Believers in strong A1 contend that a computer with the right 
programs has a mind and cognitive states; hence, the programs are 
explanations of the cognitive phenomena. Not even a belief in weak A1 is 
demanded by the information processing approach (Palmer & Kimchi, 
1986). - 
The point of drawing these distinctions in attempting to characterize 
cognitive psychology is to ensure that information processing is not falsely 
rejected as a plausible way to address questions of import to cognitive 
ethologists. Griffin (1984) states that an information processing approach 
leads to viewing the human mind "as nothing more than a computer system" 
(p. iv). As a consequence, according to Griffin, the possibility of conscious- 
ness in animals is rejected, and a major portion of psychological function is 
disregarded. This rejection of the information processing approach is an 
error for several reasons. 
First, many cognitive psychologists hold that the computer is limited in its 
ability to mimic human cognitive processing - conscious or unconscious. 
Second, a belief in strong A1 does not deny the reality of consciousness; 
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consciousness is one cognitive phenomenon of many that might be an 
emergent property of a properly programmed computer. A human mind, in 
the strong A1 view, would be nothing less (or more) than a computer 
program. Third, not all information processing models are computer- 
based. In new parallel distributed processing (PDP) models (e.g., Rumel- 
hart & McClelland, 1986), neural networks are the conceptual analogue. 
Information is represented as the state of activation of a large network of 
simple units. PDP models can account for many perceptual phenomena and 
are now being applied to the domains of memory and language learning. 
Nonconscious Cognitive Processing 
Perhaps one result of cognitive ethology's distance from cognitive psy- 
chology has been the concentration on conscious processes. Cognitive 
psychology has clearly demonstrated that many crucial aspects of human 
cognition are not conscious. This is hardly a new development. Freud's 
most lasting contribution to psychology was probably his discovery of the 
importance of nonconsciouB influences on behavior. 
There are many examples of important nonconscious phenomena in 
human cognitive processing. Consider the process of skill learning. Early 
on, conscious attention to the components of a skill such as driving a car is 
possible and may even necessary to the acquisition of the skill. After 
extended practice, however, the process becomes inaccessible to conscious- 
ness and attempts to attend to the process may interfere with its execution, 
as with skilled musicians and typists (Kihlstrom, 1987). The changes in the 
accessibility of the processes underlying skilled behavior are thought to be 
concomitant with changes in the representation of the knowledge acquired. 
Highly skilled abilities may require little or no attention and therefore do 
not necessarily compete with other processes for limited attentional re- 
sources-hence our ability to drive a car and carry on a conversation 
simultaneously. Such processes are called automatic and operate with little 
monitoring. Automatic processes sacrifice modifiability for speed and 
reduced attentional demands. 
Many different kinds of studies have shown that information from the 
external environment can be processed, and thereby affect other concurrent 
processing, without awareness. For example, in the shadowing task, 
subjects are required to repeat words that are presented only in one ear (the 
target ear), while other words are presented in the other ear. Lewis (1970) 
showed that the presentation in the nontarget ear of synonyms of the words 
being repeated caused a delay in the repetition. The subjects could not, 
however, report any of the words presented in the nontarget ear though 
these words had apparently been processed sufficiently to allow semantic 
comparison. Similarly, MacKay (1973) presented ambiguous sentences in 
one ear (e.g., Three men sat on the board) and a single word (e.g., 
executives or workers) in the other ear. Again, even though the subjects 
could not remember the words that were presented in the nontarget ear, 
they interpreted the ambiguous sentences as if they did. 
Becapse of the interaction between unconscious and conscious processes 
and the importance of each in the performance of many behaviors (simple 
and complex), it is imprudent to restrict the domain of cognitive ethology to 
conscious processes alone. If we are to develop a truly comprehensive 
account of the minds of animals, we cannot turn our attention (pun 
intended) away from any classes of cognitive events. 
AN EXAMPLE OF STUDIES OF ANIMAL COGNITION 
One consequence of the broad and intense development of human cognitive 
psychology was a revival of interest in animal cognition during the 1970s 
(e.g., Hulse, Fowler, & Honig, 1978). For the 30 years prior to this, the field 
of animal learning within psychology was almost completely dominated by 
the radical behaviorist tradition. The strength of that tradition is now much 
reduced, with most students of animal learning and behavior xlopting the 
cognitive approach that has its historical roots in Tolman's brand of 
cognitive psychology (Riley, Brown, & Yoerg, 1986). The goals of the study 
of animal cognition are similar to those of human cognitive psychology: to 
understand what occurs in the temporal gap between environmental events 
and behavior. Because a review of the field is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, we will only provide one example of animal cognitive psychology. 
Our primary goal is to illustrate how methods borrowed directly from 
cognitive psychology are powerful tools for examining mental events in 
nonhuman animals. Two symposium volumes provide other examples 
(Hulse, Fowler, & Honig, 1978; Roitblat, Bever, & Terrace, 1984). 
Sternberg (1966, 1969) developed a procedure for studying memory 
retrieval processes in humans which has proved invaluable. The essence of 
this procedure is that the human subjects are shown word lists of various 
lengths and then asked whether or not a particular word appeared on the 
list. Sands and Wright (1980, 1982) adopted this procedure for use with 
rhesus monkeys. The monkey sat before a screen on which it was shown a 
series of distinct color slides; this was the list of items to be remembered. 
The length of the list varied from one to six items. A single probe slide was 
then presented. By moving a lever to the left or right, the monkey indicated 
whether the probe slide matched a slide in the original list or was different 
from all the slides in that list. The primary dependent measure was reaction 
time-the latency to make the same/different choice. 
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When the probe item matched an item on the original list, reaction times 
increased with list length. Specifically, the addition of one more list item 
increased the latency to make the same response by about 13 msec. This 
finding supports the notion of memory scanning: The probe item was 
compared to each list item held in memory sequentially. Consequently, 
longer lists yielded longer reaction times. When the probe item did not 
match any of the list items, reaction times were slower than on same trials, 
though the slope of the function relating reaction time to list length was 
similar. This result constitutes additional support for the hypothesis of a 
serial memory scan because, on the average, it should take longer to find 
that no item on the list matches the probe than to find a match. 
Furthermore, Sands and Wright (1980,1982) found evidence for an effect 
of the serial position of the probe item in the original list; probe items that 
matched list items presented first (the primacy effect) or last (the recency 
effect) in the sequence were remembered better than those presented in the 
middle. All the results described have also been obtained with humans 
(Sternberg, 1966). 
The data generated by this simple task have illuminated one aspect of 
cognitive processing in rhesus monkeys and humans: that the retrieval of an 
item in memory, in this situation, is a systematic serial process. The 
processes responsible for the serial position effects are not completely 
understood, but any model of this type of memory must account for them. 
THE ANALYSIS OF IMAGERY IN HUMANS AND 
ANIMALS 
Cognitive ethology has not yet had a strong impact on the study of animal 
behavior. This is not because questions of animal cognition are not relevant 
to attempts to understand the role of behavior in adaptation; the analysis of 
the relations among behavior, cognition, ecology, and evolution is not only 
a legitimate area of study but a necessary one (Yoerg, in prep). Rather, 
cognitive ethology, when defined as the study of mental experience, has 
suffered from confining itself to the most intractable issues of cognition- 
consciousness, intentionality, and emotion. The difficulty of studying these 
concepts is, of course, not sufficient reason to abandon them, but the 
standards of what constitutes convincing evidence still apply. The purpose 
of this section is to explore how one phenomenon of interest -imagery- to 
current cognitive ethology has been studied within human and animal 
cognitive psychology. Whether other concepts such as conscious intent or 
awareness can be similarly analyzed is not at all clear and awaits future 
attempts. 
Human Imagery 
Images are perception-like experiences. The study of imagery is the 
elucidation of the processes that underly their formation, transformation, 
and use. Although introspective evidence for imagery is abundant, its status 
as a theoretical construct is uncertain. The source of this uncertainty is the 
difficulty in specifying the nature of the image: What is the relation between 
the part of the physical world being imagined and the image? What sort of 
representation is an image? Some argue that images are epiphenomenal or 
nonfunctional, but as Pylyshyn (1981) correctly indicates, only when we 
have ascertained what images are will we be in a position to determine if 
they are epiphenomenal. 
Two major approaches to the conceptualization of images can be 
identified: the analogue and the propositional. According to the analogue 
view, the way in which images can be transformed can be attributed to the 
medium in which images are represented or to the processes that transform 
images (e.g., Kosslyn, 1981). That is, the medium of visual image repre- 
sentation is analogous to coordinate space and mimics its properties. 
According to the propositional view, images are transformed in certain 
ways because people use their interpretation of the task and tacit knowledge 
about the physical properties of the world and apply them to images 
(Pylyshyn, 1981). The phenomena, then, that appear to support a corre- 
spondence between imaging and the act of seeing are really only evidence 
for what subjects believe about physical space and what they perceive is the 
goal of the task. 
Consider the following experiment. Imagine a baseball diamond and 
focus on homeplate. Now shift your focus to first base. Suppose the latency 
to make this shift was recorded, for instance, by pushing a button when the 
instruction to shift was given and pushing it again when you successfully 
focussed on first base. Now return your focus to homebase and then shift 
it to left center field. The common finding in this type of experiment is that 
the latency to make the second shift is greater than the first; indeed, the 
difference corresponds to the actual difference in physical distance in the 
scene, assuming it has been accurately imagined. In the mental rotation task 
(e.g., Shepard & Metzler, 1971), subjects are asked to judge whether a 
rotated object was the same as a standard form or the mirror image of the 
form. The latency to make this response depends on the angular disparity 
between the rotated and standard forms suggesting that the subjects were 
mentally rotating an image of the form. 
Proponents of the analogue account of imagery use such data to identify 
properties of images, for example, "images have spatial extent" and 
preserve "relative metric space" (Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, & Schwartz, 1979, 
p. 536) and to develop elaborate models of image representation and 
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processing. The correspondence between the time to scan an image and the 
actual physical distances represented in that image are taken as evidence 
that images have properties in common with the external world. Proponents 
of the propositional account dispute this claim; they argue that the 
empirical evidence suggests only that images represent distances not that 
images have distances (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1981). The difference is that the laws 
of the physical world that govern events in the actual scene are not 
necessarily the laws that govern representations of those events. A model 
that accounts for the scanning data must indicate why it takes longer to scan 
representations of greater physical distances. "There is no law of nature that 
demands that it must take longer to go from representation A to represen- 
tation B when A and B merely represent locations that are further apart in 
the world" (Pylyshyn, 1979, p. 562). 
Nonhuman Animal Imagery 
Our aim in presenting these accounts is some detail (and we have omitted 
the lion's share of it) is to demonstrate the difficulties inherent in the study 
of mental experiences. Scores of well-designed experiments have been aimed 
at clarifying the nature of mental imagery in humans - a phenomenon that 
(in humans) is generally not disputed, and there is little agreement among 
researchers about the meaning of the results. We can expect that the study 
of imagery in nonhuman animals will be fraught with additional difficul- 
ties. 
Neisworth and Rilling (1987) have developed a procedure that they 
believe is a first step in the study of imagery in animals. The task requires 
pigeons to respond appropriately to a moving clock hand that disappears 
and then reappears. The authors are circumspect in interpreting their 
findings, claiming only that the pigeon's ability to accurately represent 
movement may have required imagery. They suggest that additional 
experiments using a variety of procedures are needed to establish imagery in 
pigeons. 
But their definition of imagery is imprecise: A representation is an image 
if it contains perceptual information (e.g., size and color) and if it can be 
transformed similarly to the represented object. They assert that "transfor- 
mations of a mental representation require memory in picturelike form" 
(Neisworth & Rilling, 1987, p. 203). They do not specify what picturelike 
means. This is, of course, exactly the focus of the Kosslyn-Pylyshyn debate, 
and would seem to be less of a logical necessity than a plausible hypothesis. 
Neisworth and Rilling's (1987) results are intriguing, but whether they 
constitute even preliminary evidence for imagery in pigeons is unclear and 
will remain unclear until theories of image representation gain precision. 
We do not advocate abandoning such research but, like Neisworth and 
Rilling (1987), suggest that we proceed extremely cautiously. 
It should be noted that the phenomenon of imagery may be more 
amenable to rigorous analysis than that of consciousness or awareness. 
Most cognitive psychologists would agree that images are a type of 
representation, but images and/or representations need not be conscious. 
However, there is little consensus on what constitutes consciousness or 
awareness. This is not to say that an information processing approach 
precludes an analysis of consciousness with the appropriate scientific 
procedures; indeed, such attempts have been recently made (e.g., Johnson- 
Laird, 1983; Marcel, 1983a, 1983b). 
Finally, these two case histories -serial scanning and imagery - occasion 
an important methodological cautionary note. In each case, very careful 
detailed laboratory work was required to establish what we now know 
about these topics, and we do not know much about the role of conscious- 
ness, awareness, or intentions in either case. It seems unlikely that we will 
make much progress on the complex issues raised by the cognitive approach 
without some of the research being carried out under highly controlled 
conditions. 
The Ethological Approach to Animal Cognition 
The four questions about behavior distinguished by Tinbergen (1963)- 
mechanism, ontogeny, function, and phylogeny - define the central core of 
the study of animal behavior. If ethology is the study of animal behavior, 
then obviously these four questions are the issues ethologists must address. 
In these terms, cognitive ethology should be the attempt to study the 
mechanisms, development, functions, and evolutionary history of cognitive 
processes. This attempt will have to cut across the traditional boundaries 
between several academic disciplines, primarily psychology and ethology, 
but also the other cognitive sciences (computer science, linguistics, and 
anthropology). 
The boundaries between experimental animal psychology and ethology 
are crumbling. Meaningful integrative theoretical and empirical work has 
been taking place. For example: 
1. Psychological models of timing, particularly the scalar expectancy 
model (Gibbon, 1977) has been successfully applied to foraging 
problems (Lucas, 1987), and integration of this mechanistic theory 
q d  optimality theory may prove extremely useful; 
2. Psychological techniques and theories have been applied to the 
ecological and ethological concept of the search image resulting in 
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new insights into the mechanisms underlying the detection of 
cryptic prey (Getty, Kamil, & Real, 1987); 
3. The mechanisms responsible for the recovery of cached food by 
parids (Shettleworth & Krebs, 1982) and Clark's nutcrackers (Kamil 
& Balda, 1985) have been studied by biologists and psychologists 
working collaboratively, and this research is increasing our under- 
standing both of spatial memory and of the ecology of scatter- 
hoarding (Balda, Bunch, Kamil, Sherry, & Tomback, 1987). 
In view of these and other developments, a comprehensive integration of 
psychological information processing approaches with those of ethology 
and behavioral ecology is at hand. Explicit detailed knowledge of the 
history of the advances made and problems encountered by each approach 
will expedite this integration, The history of the psychological study of 
animal cognition contains much that is useful to the modern ethologist 
interested in cognition. A study of this history can lead to the avoidance of 
errors committed and the acceptance of valuable procedures and concepts 
(Kamil, 1983). 
The core of the matter is as follows: Cognitive organization and 
processing has an evolutionary history and, it is reasonable to assume, serve 
adaptive functions. Because behavior is determined by the interaction of 
environmental (ecological) and cognitive events, an interdisciplinary ap- 
proach to the study of behavior is demanded, whether the behavior of 
interest is the result of processing that is simple or complex, conscious or 
unconscious. This interdisciplinary approach will follow logically from the 
broad definition of cognitive ethology that we suggest. 
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